Predicting Violent Behavior: What Can Neuroscience Add? by Faigman, David L.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2018
Predicting Violent Behavior: What Can
Neuroscience Add?
David L. Faigman
UC Hastings College of the Law, faigmand@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
David L. Faigman, Predicting Violent Behavior: What Can Neuroscience Add?, 22 Trends Cognitive Sci. 111 (2018).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1704
Predicting violent behavior: What can neuroscience add?
Russell A. Poldrack1, John Monahan2, Peter B. Imrey3, Valerie Reyna4, Marcus Raichle5, 
David Faigman6, and Joshua W. Buckholtz7
1Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA
2School of Law, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA
3Department of Quantitative Health Sciences, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH
4Human Neuroscience Institute, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
5Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO
6University of California Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, CA
7Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Abstract
The ability to accurately predict violence and other forms of serious antisocial behavior would 
provide important societal benefits, and there is substantial enthusiasm for the potential predictive 
accuracy of neuroimaging techniques. We review the current status of violence prediction using 
actuarial and clinical methods, and assess the current state of neuroprediction. We then outline a 
number of questions that need to be addressed by future studies of neuroprediction if 
neuroimaging and other neuroscientific markers are to be successfully translated into public policy
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The utility of violence prediction
Each year, the United States loses nearly 3.2 trillion dollars to crime [1], with violent crime 
responsible for the majority of these costs [2]. This figure includes victim-specific losses 
such as opportunity costs and lost productivity, but the costs of treatment and incarceration 
for offenders–which are borne by all citizens - are no less staggering. Violence (and other 
forms of serious antisocial behavior) is not a normally distributed “trait;” rather, a relatively 
small subset of individuals is responsible for the vast majority of violent crime. The ability 
to prospectively identify those predisposed to commit violent criminal behavior would be of 
great benefit in guiding decisions regarding bail, sentencing, probation/parole, court-ordered 
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treatment, and civil commitment. At the level of policy, valid measures of individualized risk 
for future violence would be immensely useful for targeting prevention and treatment-related 
spending to maximize its benefit [3].
While behavioral prediction has a long - and somewhat fraught - history in the realm of law 
and policy, recent advances in brain imaging have renewed interest in the potential to 
accurately predict violent behavior. In particular, new insights into the neurobiological 
architecture of violence and antisocial behavior [4–6] have generated substantial excitement 
about the potential utility of neuroscientific methods for predicting future violent behavior 
(what some have termed “neuroprediction”) [7,8]. The purpose of this paper is to critically 
analyze the current state of neuroprediction in law, in order to guide future research and aid 
policy-makers as they consider whether and how to apply such research. To that end, we will 
first briefly summarize the history of behavioral and genetic prediction in law, and then 
review the current state of neuroprediction efforts. We then review the challenges inherent in 
any attempt to predict future behavior. We discuss several statistical and methodological 
hurdles to valid predictive inference, which are general to any domain of prediction, and 
outline best practices for future studies of neuroprediction.
Note that predictive models for binary outcomes (such as criminal recidivism) assess risks -- 
i.e. probabilities within groups -- rather than forecasting individual outcomes. Nonetheless, 
it is useful to administratively classify persons based on whether their group’s risk exceeds a 
threshold. Policies based on such classification, even using mediocre models, can often 
virtually guarantee aggregate gains, and thus that a plurality of those affected will benefit 
from the policy.
Behavioral prediction of future violent behavior
Courts are tasked with both retrospective and prospective functions. Decisions about bail, 
probation, and sentence length all reflect the fact that courts have a duty to prevent future 
criminal acts in addition to determining guilt and assigning punishment for crimes that have 
already been committed. Using behavioral risk factors to predict who will commit crime has 
been an important component of American criminal law since the rise of probation and 
parole in the late 19th-century, and a major concern of the mental health system since the 
shift from “need for treatment” to “dangerousness” as the legal standard for civil 
commitment in the 1970s [9]. A milestone in the scientific literature was the distinction 
made by Meehl [10] between “clinical” prediction (in which predictions are based on a 
clinician’s subjective judgments about a particular case) and “actuarial” (or statistical) 
approaches to behavioral prediction (which rely upon statistical models to predict relevant 
outcomes; see Box 1 for a detailed discussion of the general concept of “prediction”). 
Across nearly every domain tested, actuarial approaches have been shown to outperform 
clinical prediction, to such an extent that Meehl [11]stated that “There is no controversy in 
social science which shows such a large body of qualitatively diverse studies coming out so 
uniformly in the same direction as this one.” In the context of violent behavior, a 
representative review of behavioral prediction [12] concluded that “one area in which the 
statistical method is most clearly superior to the clinical approach is the prediction of 
violence.” That is, in head-to-head contests between predictions that reflect the subjective 
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judgments of human experts and predictions based on validated statistical models, the 
statistical models have nearly always won.
Box 1
What does “prediction” mean?
The concept of “prediction” is fraught with misconception, in part due to the multiple 
overlapping ways the term is used in scientific discourse. In common language, 
prediction generally implies the anticipation of a future outcome based on information 
available in the present. This is our primary meaning of the term in the present context, as 
it would be in most legal contexts. Such predictions are made without knowledge of the 
outcome, using information that temporally precedes that outcome. This usage is, 
however, different from that often used in the context of statistical modeling, where the 
term “predicted value” may be used to describe the output of a fitted regression model 
obtained for some specific values of the model’s input variables. This latter usage is 
indifferent to the relative timing of the input and outcome variables, and also to whether 
the specific data point being used to generate the “prediction” was also used in fitting the 
statistical model.
The fields of statistics and machine learning have developed sophisticated frameworks for 
fitting models in ways that that allow quantification and optimization of the ability to 
accurately predict outcomes for new samples, which we take to be the sine qua non of 
“prediction”[73–76]. A fundamental motivation for more recent developments is an 
appreciation of the pervasiveness of “overfitting”. Whenever a model is fit to a specific 
dataset, the fitted parameters reflect both the signal in the data as well as the noise in that 
dataset; this occurs even for simple models such as strictly linear regression on a single 
predictor, but becomes increasingly problematic as the model becomes more complex. 
An implication of this is that models will nearly always fit the dataset used to develop 
them better than any other dataset [77], and thus that assessment of model goodness of fit 
using the same data that were used to estimate the model parameters will almost 
necessarily understate the model error when applied to new data. This phenomenon is 
known as “shrinkage”[77].; Although there are methods for estimating and correcting for 
shrinkage using standard parametric statistics, a more common approach arising from the 
field of machine learning is to perform “cross-validation”, in which the model is 
iteratively fit using subsets of a dataset (known as “training sets”) and then used to 
predict the values of the held-out observations ( “test sets” or “validation sets”). These 
approaches allow one to estimate the model’s performance on data that played no role in 
the fitting of the model, which reduces the optimistic bias in predictive accuracy that 
arises from overfitting when the same data are used to train and test the model. Although 
cross-validation can provide valid estimates of out-of-sample generalization, it is not a 
panacea, and can be easily misused in ways that can still inflate one’s estimates of 
predictive accuracy [78].
In recent years, many behavioral instruments aimed at predicting crime have been published 
that are not adequately characterized by a simple clinical-actuarial dichotomy. Rather, the 
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behavioral risk assessment process now exists on a continuum of rule-based structure, with 
completely unstructured (“clinical”) assessment occupying one pole of the continuum, 
completely structured (“actuarial”) assessment occupying the other pole, and several forms 
of partially-structured assessment lying in between [13]. While there is general agreement 
that structured behavioral approaches are more predictively valid than unstructured ones, 
how completely structured behavioral approaches compare with partially-structured 
behavioral approaches (often termed “structured professional judgment”) is unresolved. One 
meta-analysis of 28 studies found that the predictive validities of nine completely or 
partially-structured prediction instruments were essentially “interchangeable” [14]. One 
explanation for why different violence prediction instruments yield comparable accuracy is 
that they measure shared risk dimensions. In a memorable demonstration of this point[15], 
the items from several instruments were printed on paper strips, placed in a coffee can, 
shaken, and randomly redistributed to create new prediction instruments. The “coffee can 
instruments” predicted violent offenses as well as the originals from which the items came.
On the whole, this body of work shows that specific behavioral and trait dimensions can be 
used to predict future violence with some degree of accuracy. However, even the best 
predictive models are far from perfect [14]. Indeed, more recent meta-analytic work has 
quantified the positive and negative predictive value of a range of risk assessment devices 
[16], showing that these measures have a positive likelihood ratio (pLR: the ratio of the 
likelihood of a positive prediction for those who do to those who don’t subsequently offend) 
ranging from about 3.5 to 8. For comparison to medical diagnosis, the pLR for right lower 
abdominal pain in appendicitis is 8.4 [17]. Moreover, despite its clear superiority to clinical 
prediction, actuarial prediction has encountered significant pushback, with objections to so-
called “moneyball sentencing” based on behavioral risk factors (e.g., employment, 
education) made on constitutional, ethical, and theoretical grounds [9,18,19]. These 
challenges, in concert with the explosion of interest in cognitive neuroscience over the last 
decade, have led some to focus on the use of biologically-based variables as predictive 
markers. A substantial body of previous work has examined the use of genetic prediction 
(see Box 2), but here we focus on the use of direct measurements of brain activity through 
neuroimaging. For a more general discussion of the use of neuroscientific and genetic 
evidence in the courtroom, see [20]
Box 2
Lessons from the Genetics of Antisocial Behavior and Violence
Data from twin and family studies show that antisocial behavioral generally, and violence 
specifically, is moderately heritable. Genetic factors appear to account for 40–60% of the 
population-level variance in broad-band antisocial phenotypes[79], and heritability is 
considerably higher (>80%) for subtypes encompassing both antisocial behavior and 
callous-unemotional traits[80,81]. A number of risk-associated genetic variants have been 
identified[82], but considerable attention has been focused on one specific polymorphism 
in the MAOA gene (encoding the enzyme monoamine oxidase A). MAOA first came to 
prominence in series of family-based studies of severely violent men, who were found to 
possess a mutation that blocked production of this enzyme[83,84]. Complimentary work 
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subsequently demonstrated that genetic deletion or hypoexpression of maoa markedly 
increased impulsive and aggressive behavior in mice[85–87].
While mutations with effects as large as those described above are rare, a common 
functional polymorphism exists in the MAOA gene that modulates expression of the 
MAOA enzyme in the brain [88]. Significant associations with the low-expressing allele 
(MAOA-L) of this variant have been reported in adult substance abusers[89–93], 
adolescents with behavioral problems[83,84,94], and high levels of antisocial 
traits[95,96][97]. These findings are largely consistent with a large body of work in 
across species that links dysregulation in serotonin function during ontogeny to 
impulsive-aggressive behavior[98].
The research cited above has led to the introduction of genetic testing for MAOA variants 
in several recent murder cases in the U.S. and Europe, in which putative positive results 
were introduced as mitigating evidence at sentencing, sometimes successfully. This is 
concerning because numerous studies have failed to replicate the association between 
MAOA variants and antisocial/violent behavior [99–105], in line with field-wide 
concerns about the replicability of candidate gene approaches[106]. Moreover, even in 
studies reporting significant associations the effect sizes tend to be small. A recent 
paper[107] is notable for being an exception to this general rule, concluding that 5–10% 
of all severe crime in Finland could be attributable to genetic variants in MAOA and 
another gene (CDH13). However, their use of an extreme groups approach in a very small 
sample suggests an overestimation of the true amount of variance explained by these two 
common variants.
Given that effect sizes for individual genetic variants are so low, possessing a “risk” allele 
provides little predictive information about whether a given individual is more or less 
likely to commit violence. Roughly 40% of the population carries the low-expressing 
MAOA allele (in individuals of European descent; allele frequencies vary by ancestry), 
yet it is estimated that <0.01% of the U.S. population are arrested each year for violent 
crime1. In other words, most people who possess the MAOA risk allele never go on to 
commit acts of violence, suggesting that predictions of violence based on MAOA variant 
status would likely lead to a very high rate of false positives. Similar conclusions can be 
made for other previously proposed candidate genetic markers for criminal activity, such 
as the 5-HTTLPR variant[98].
Enter: Neuroprediction
The advent of neuroimaging has marked a paradigm shift in understanding the biological 
basis of human behavior. In the last quarter century, neuroscientists have witnessed the 
explosive development of new tools for measuring brain function, structure, chemistry, and 
connectivity. The promise of opening the black box of the human mind and wresting that 
which is most personal - beliefs, motivations, intentions, and capacities- from our brains has 
also generated substantial excitement amongst the general public. Each new neuroscientific 
1https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-43
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advance is greeted with a chorus of speculation about its application to the real world, and 
nowhere is the level of anticipation higher than in the courts, because law - more than almost 
any other profession - faces daily the challenge of rendering judgements based on the 
contents of that black box. Given lingering skepticism about actuarial prediction, the rapid 
pace of discovery in neuroscience - coupled with the assumption among non-specialists that 
biological variables are somehow more “real” than demographic or psychological ones - has 
generated a great deal of enthusiasm for the use of brain imaging measures to predict 
violence. Enthusiasm for neuroprediction is due, in part, to the presumed closer biological 
proximity of brain-based measures to the causal processes that produce violent behavior, 
which makes it reasonable to assume that measures of brain activity might support better 
predictions. Indeed, neuroimaging techniques have great potential, but there are a number of 
concerns about their application to complex real-world behaviors such as violence, which we 
outline in the following sections.
Whether courts will be receptive to such biological risk factors is uncertain [21]; see Box 3 
for a further discussion of the use of scientific data in legal decision making about individual 
cases, known as the G2i (group to individual) problem. The United States Supreme Court 
recently overturned a death penalty because an expert witness had testified that race was 
“know[n] to predict future dangerousness.” The Court stated that the case “is a disturbing 
departure from a basic premise of our criminal justice system: Our law punishes people for 
what they do, not who they are” (Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 2017). Whether 
neuroscience markers will be considered attributes of “who a person is” in this sense is 
unclear.
Box 3
Making individual predictions from group data: The G2I problem
The application of scientific research to legal settings raises a problem known as the 
“group to individual” (G2i) problem [108–111], which has its roots in a key difference 
between the goals of science and the legal system. Science is focused on characterizing 
generalizable phenomena to establish mechanistic explanations that apply within 
definable population groups and hence are generalizable to other members of those 
populations (who may not yet have been observed). As a means to this end, most 
scientific work aims to describe observations about groups of individuals and/or 
collections of circumstances. By contrast, law is concerned with making concrete and 
definitive determinations about particular individuals and circumstances [112]. Thus, in 
science, individuals are generally incidental to the general insights they support, while in 
law the individual is paramount: group or population-level scientific data are only 
relevant to the extent that the data bolster or weaken the evidence provided in an 
individual case. Unfortunately, however, observations about groups only rarely apply 
universally to their individual members, such that group-level findings may provide only 
very weak support for individual determinations. The G2i problem is relevant for any 
scientific domain in which there is variability across individuals, including but not limited 
to neuroscientific measures.
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Consider the following example. A neuroscientist uses fMRI to scan 100 participants 
who are instructed to either lie or tell the truth about a set of facts. Contrasting brain 
activity during lying with truth-telling reveals statistically significant activation in 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). This permits the valid group-level inference that 
lying is associated with DLPFC engagement. However, examination of each individual’s 
data reveals that while most subjects exhibited higher DLPFC activity during lying, some 
participants showed no difference and still others demonstrated lower DLPFC activity 
during lying compared to truth-telling. In other words, “heightened DLPFC activity 
accompanies lying” may be a valid group-level inference, but the application of this 
inference to any one individual invites serious and profoundly consequential risk of both 
false positives and false negatives [113]. Legal testimony in a hearing regarding 
admissibility of fMRI lie detection in a federal Medicare fraud case provides an example 
of the type of quandary that can arise. The scientist who was hired to administer fMRI lie 
detection in support of the defendant’s innocence testified that the test was valid evidence 
of the defendant’s general veracity, but refused to testify that the test confirmed the 
truthfulness of his answer to any specific question at issue in the case. For this and other 
reasons, the testimony was not admitted in evidence (US vs. Semrau, 07-10074 Ml/P). In 
this case, the “individual” was a specific item rather than an individual person, 
demonstrating the broad reach of the G2i problem.
The complex causal structure of real-world behavior
Whereas cognitive neuroscience has taught us a great deal about the neural bases of basic 
cognitive, emotional, and social functions, we still know almost nothing about how trait-like 
aspects of brain function, structure, chemistry or connectivity interact with social context 
and other dynamic environmental factors to determine real-world behaviors such as 
violence. What we can safely infer from recent work in other domains is that the causal 
structure of these behaviors will be highly complex and multiply determined. With regard to 
genetics, the last two decades of genome-wide association studies (GWAS) have shown that 
any particular common genetic variant (e.g. those appearing in at least 1% of the population) 
is unlikely to account for large effects on common phenotypes. For example, GWAS have 
been used to identify replicable associations between common genetic variants and 
behavioral phenotypes (such as educational attainment [22]) and mental illness (e.g. 
schizophrenia [23]). However, each of these individual associations accounts for a 
vanishingly small amount of variance in the phenotype (usually less than 1%); it is only 
through the aggregation of large numbers of variants that one can start to account for the 
heritability of these behaviors. The large effects estimated in earlier candidate-gene studies 
were likely due to the combination of small samples (which are only powered to find large 
effects) and publication bias[24].
On analogy to genetic data, it seems likely that any one measure of brain function, structure, 
chemistry and connectivity will account for only a small amount of variance in violent 
behavior. Further, while the neurobiological basis of inter-individual variability is coming 
into increasing focus, we still know relatively little about how individual brains change over 
time (intra-individual variability) [25]. Likewise, the relevance of lab-based measures of 
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self-control (to take one relevant example) for predicting individual variability in real-world 
behavior remains largely unclear. These latter two issues are especially germane to the 
problem of violence prediction because violent behavior typically results from the 
interaction of trait-like vulnerabilities in capacities related to self-control and emotion 
regulation[6] with time-varying state factors (e.g. stress level and sleep deprivation) and 
punctate eliciting events (e.g. provocation). It is difficult to reconcile the static nature of lab-
based assessments that might be used for prediction with the dynamic nature of real-world 
violence. In addition, violence is a multidimensional construct, encompassing both reactive 
subtypes (reflecting poor inhibitory control and emotion regulation) and goal-directed 
subtypes (reflecting maladaptive action valuation)[26,27]. As these two facets of violence 
likely reflect distinct neural mechanisms[27], it would seem unlikely that a single measure 
(such as the commonly used go/no-go task) could assess risk for both. On balance, it would 
seem safe to conjecture that accurate neuroprediction, if possible, will require aggregation of 
neuroscientific data across multiple cognitive tasks and multiple measurement techniques.
Neuroprediction: Where do we stand?
Insights into the neurobiology of violence can be gleaned from an emerging body of brain 
imaging work in clinical populations characterized by high levels of violent behavior, 
especially people with psychopathy. Psychopathy is a particularly useful model for 
understanding the neurobiology of violence because it encompasses both affective-
interpersonal symptoms thought to underlie goal-directed violence and impulsive-antisocial 
symptoms linked to reactive violence. In addition, it appears to be the psychological trait 
most predictive of violent behavior[28]. It may thus serve as an effective intermediate 
phenotype (or “endophenotype”[29]) for the study of violent behavior.
Structural and functional fMRI results converge to suggest that maladaptive behavior in 
psychopathy - including violence - may arise from dysfunction within cortico-limbic and 
cortico-striatal circuitry involved in affective arousal, emotion regulation, and value-based 
decision-making. For instance, psychopathic individuals exhibit decreased amygdala and 
vmPFC gray matter volume, as well as lower vmPFC cortical thickness [30,31]. Likewise, 
psychopaths show reduced recruitment of amygdala and vmPFC during fear conditioning 
and moral decision making [32–35], blunted amygdala responsiveness during affective 
perspective-taking [36,37], and weaker vmPFC engagement in response to empathogenic 
[38] and facial emotion stimuli [39]. Reduced functional and structural connectivity between 
amygdala and vmPFC has also been reported in psychopathy [36]. There is some evidence 
that the observed relationships between psychopathy, task-related brain activity and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex--amygdala connectivity are driven by the affective-
interpersonal features of the disorder [35,39–42]. On the whole, this work is consistent with 
the notion that the socio-emotional deficits of psychopaths may arise from cortico-limbic 
circuit dysfunction [43,44].
While cortico-limbic dysfunction appears to play an especially prominent role in the 
affective-interpersonal dimension of psychopathy, recent work highlights the importance of 
cortico-striatal dysfunction for impulsive-antisocial symptoms in the disorder. 
Amphetamine-induced dopamine release and reward anticipation-related activity within the 
Poldrack et al. Page 8













nucleus accumbens (NAcc) have been shown to be elevated in individuals with high levels of 
impulsive-antisocial traits[41,45–47]. Likewise, several groups have found evidence for 
increased striatal gray matter volume in psychopathic offenders, particularly those with a 
history of impulsive violence[48,49]. Notably, impulsive-antisocial behavior has also been 
linked to prefrontal dysfunction during tasks of inhibitory control[27]. The combination of 
diminished prefrontal activity and heightened striatal responsiveness has led some to suggest 
that social norm transgressions, such as violence, could arise from impaired prefrontal 
modulation of striatal value representations[6]. The studies above comprise a potentially 
important empirical foundation for considering the neuroprediction of violence (but see [50] 
for an important discussion of the differences between causation and prediction). It should 
however be noted that most of these studies have not yet been replicated and, due to the 
difficulties associated with enrolling criminal offenders, involved relatively small sample 
sizes. Recent work by Kiehl and colleagues using mobile fMRI in comparatively large 
samples of currently incarcerated offenders [51] represents a notable exception, and offers a 
useful example of how present limitations in this area might be overcome (see Box 4 for 
further discussion of this work).
Box 4
Neuroprediction of future criminal behavior
One study [51] has directly examined the predictive utility of neuroimaging data for 
future criminal acts. Ninety-six adult offenders (incarcerated for either violent or 
nonviolent crimes) were tested prior to release on a go/no-go task using fMRI, and the 
relation between task-related activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and felony 
rearrests over up to four years (median 34.5 months) of follow-up was examined. The 
estimated probabilities of rearrest for those with ACC responses below and above the 
sample median were 60% and 46%, respectively. Rearrests for violent crimes were too 
rare in the sample to support a separate analysis, so the study’s results have only limited 
direct bearing on violence prediction, but the report raises questions that will similarly 
apply to future studies of neuroprediction.
The study is an impressive logistic accomplishment. A mobile MRI scanning facility was 
used on site at multiple correctional facilities, with well-established psychological testing 
and fMRI image-acquisition protocols. Target and control ROIs were prespecified, with 
seed coordinates chosen on the basis of peak BOLD activity in a comparably-sized non-
offender sample. While rearrest outcomes did not evidently influence data extraction or 
statistical modeling choices, this paper and all others of similar nature would benefit from 
inclusion of explicit statements that the analyses were blinded to outcomes of interest, 
and formal pre-registration of the analysis plans.
A further analysis reported a survival model, but did not directly quantify prediction 
accuracy. This was addressed in a follow-up paper [114] using a receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) analysis [115]. This paper also used bootstrap resampling to 
estimate and correct for shrinkage (overoptimism bias), which reduced estimated ROC 
areas from 68% and 76% (for all arrests and nonviolent arrests respectively) to the more 
conservative values of 63% and 69%, values described as “modest.” There are, however, 
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two limitations. The bootstrap correction of overoptimism bias relies primarily on in-
sample prediction, and thus on average tends to somewhat undercorrect for bias 
(compared to crossvalidation methods). More importantly, the approach was applied only 
to the full model, and thus does not provide overoptimism-corrected estimates relevant to 
the primary question of interest, which is the incremental contributions of ACC to 
predictive accuracy.. Repeated crossvalidation of the incremental ACC contributions to 
predictive accuracy would thus have increased the utility of this report. More generally, 
inclusion of overoptimism bias-corrected estimates of the incremental contributions of 
neuroimaging or other neuroscience-based markers would be similarly important in 
future reports of this nature.
Finally, wide scientific acceptance of any neuroimaging predictor of violence will require 
true validation by a combination of replications across a set of separate cohorts varying 
widely in sociodemographic, psychopathological, and criminological characteristics.
Finally, the body of work highlighted above does not speak to underlying brain circuit 
dysfunction underlying violence per se. Rather, these studies focus largely on psychopathy, 
which is certainly associated with violence but not to the degree that it could be considered a 
proxy. As one example, while amygdala dysfunction in psychopathy has been replicated by 
multiple groups, we know of no work to date that examines the specificity of amygdala 
dysfunction for violent behavior. Without such work, it is impossible to know whether 
amygdala dysfunction in psychopathy is responsible for the higher rates of violence in 
psychopathic individuals, versus - as one example - their need for stimulation or boredom 
proneness. Research in this area would be considerably advanced by a stronger focus 
symptom specificity, with the goal of mapping brain circuit dysfunction to specific sets of 
behaviors (e.g. violence and aggression) rather than categorical disorders[52].
The well-established association between psychopathy and violent behavior, in concert with 
our advancing understanding of the neurobiology of psychopathy, hint that it might be 
possible to predict future criminal behavior from neuroimaging data. However well 
motivated such an endeavor may be, we note that any particular neuroimaging signature of 
psychopathy need not, in principle, predict violence any better – or even as well as – related 
clinical or behavioral measures. Thus, studies must address several open questions before 
such candidate neuroimaging signatures for violent behavior can be seriously entertained 
(see Outstanding Questions). There have been remarkably few studies that have directly 
examined the relationship between neuroscientific variables and violence. One remarkable 
example is discussed in detail in Box 4, where we examine the application of the foregoing 
principles to the landmark study by Aharoni and colleagues [51].
Outstanding Questions Box
• Is the protocol for eliciting the signature from a future individual explicit 
enough and robust enough for effective replication in a range of other 
settings?
• Were the components of the protocol for each subject (regions of interest, 
masks, normalizations, measures of hemodynamic response and BOLD 
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contrast) completely uninfluenced by, and preferably blinded to, that subject’s 
criminal behavior outcomes?
• Are the statistical measures used to report prediction benefit supported by 
methodological studies in the prediction analysis literature, and are these 
measures reported with error ranges accounting for measurement and 
sampling variability?
• Do reported measures of predictive benefit include measures of incremental 
predictive value, relative to prediction from other non-neuroimaging measures 
(which are likely to be less onerous and/or expensive to ascertain)?
• Were these measures and their error ranges obtained from a) direct estimation 
from the entire derivation sample, b) bootstrap validation or c) cross-
validation from the derivation sample, d) from a test sample withheld from the 
model-fitting process, and/or e) from one or more entirely external validation 
samples?
• Does the sample have appropriate demographic representation and does it 
access the full distribution of relevant behaviors? For example, if an 
incarcerated population is used, does it sample the full distribution of criminal 
phenotypes (e.g. never violent, occasionally violent, frequently violent?). If 
stratified sampling is used, is the variable employed for stratifying 
psychometrically valid and amenable to independent corroboration (e.g. by 
department of correction records, charging documents, etc.)? If a non-
incarcerated comparison group is used for inference, is this group matched 
along relevant demographics (e.g. substance use, SES, race, education, 
reading ability)?
Neuroprediction in other domains
Beyond the realm of violence, there are several examples of studies that have effectively 
used neuroimaging for prediction of behavioral outcomes, an area reviewed recently [53]. 
One particular domain that has seen recent success is the prediction of treatment outcomes 
in psychiatric disorders. While many studies have examined associations between 
neuroimaging signals and treatment outcomes, only recently have appropriate predictive 
modeling tools been applied to properly assess predictive validity. One study [54] examined 
the relation between brain responses to angry versus neutral faces and response to cognitive-
behavioral therapy in individuals with social anxiety disorder. A model including both brain 
responses as well as variables reflecting drug treatment group and disease severity was able 
to account for 41% of the variance in symptom change, versus 12% for a model that only 
included the severity and drug variables. In another example, [55] investigators examined 
whether the interaction between early life stress and amygdala response to fearful or happy 
faces could be used to predict the response to antidepressant medications in depressed 
individuals. Using cross validation, they showed that the prediction model using these 
variables was substantially better than one that did not include fMRI variables; the cross-
validated sensitivity of the best model was 0.84, and the specificity was 0.69, suggesting that 
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the technique could potentially provide useful information to physicians. Each of these 
studies was relatively small and will thus require further replication and validation, but they 
suggest that there is potential for neuroimaging in the prediction of behavioral outcomes and 
treatment response. We would also propose that the principles and best practices raised in 
the present paper would be useful as guideposts for neuroprediction regardless of the 
specific domain of prediction, and thus could be useful in assessing these studies of 
psychiatric neuroprediction as well.
Challenges for neuroprediction
There are a number of potential challenges that will make the practical application of 
neuroprediction difficult, particularly with regard to the prediction of future violent acts.
Foremost are the selection effects that are likely to occur due to the specific requirements of 
the imaging process. Participation in an fMRI study requires a relatively compliant 
individual who is willing to enter the scanner and behave as instructed. Thus, oppositional or 
defiant individuals are unlikely to be successfully imaged, and individuals with a chaotic 
lifestyle are likely to have trouble keeping their appointment for imaging. Even for 
compliant individuals, there are selection effects that may occur in relation to impulsivity. 
Highly impulsive individuals are less able to remain still in an MRI scanner for long periods 
of time [56], such that even if they are successfully imaged, their data may be corrupted or 
have lower signal-to-noise in comparison to non-impulsive individuals. In practice, it may be 
very difficult to disentangle reduced task activation from increased noise due to head 
motion.
A second challenge comes from the potential for intentional countermeasures. Once 
predictive models are developed, it is likely that strategies could be developed to help 
individuals appear less dangerous. Some obvious strategies include intentional head 
movement or breath holding, both of which would induce signal changes substantially larger 
than the small (1–5%) changes induced by task activation. More subtle evasive strategies 
could rely upon cognitive subversion. For example, a subject in the go/no-go task might be 
coached to try to withhold his or her responses on go trials; such subterfuge could 
potentially be detected (e.g. through analysis of the behavioral data) but nonetheless would 
leave neuroprediction methods open to questions of reliability and sensitivity, and detecting 
these countermeasures is likely to be more difficult than detecting countermeasures on 
psychological tests. Recent work in lie detection [57] and memory detection [58] has shown 
that such cognitive countermeasures can substantially reduce the accuracy of fMRI 
classification of mental states.
A third challenge relates to the degree to which observed neuroscientific predictors may be 
confounded with other variables that are actually supporting predictive validity. An 
outstanding example of this was seen in the ADHD-200 competition to generate diagnostic 
classifiers for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder based on neuroimaging data[59]. An 
initial neuroimaging dataset with 776 individuals (491 healthy controls and 285 individuals 
diagnosed with ADHD) was released for use in model development; later, an unlabeled test 
dataset comprising 197 individuals was released, and competitors were asked to submit their 
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predictions for each individual (ADHD vs. control, and further diagnosis of ADHD 
subtypes). Many of the competitors were able to generate predictive models with above-
chance accuracy on the basis of the neuroimaging data, but the best performing model did 
not actually use the imaging data at all --- it simply used the demographic data (age, sex, 
handedness, and IQ), which allowed accurate prediction of ADHD status because of sex and 
IQ differences between the subject groups[60]. Without large enough samples to pull out 
such potential confounds, the interpretation of neuroimaging results in terms of mechanism 
will be very challenging.
A final challenge comes in assessing the generalizability of reported predictive accuracy to 
new samples. There is increasing concern about the degree to which results reported in the 
literature may overestimate the true sizes of reported effects [24]. In comparison to 
behavioral models, neuroimaging data have much higher dimensionality and much greater 
analytic flexibility [cf. 61], and it is known that this flexibility can grossly inflate Type I 
error rates [62,63]. There is also growing concern that the use of machine learning methods 
with small samples can result in highly inflated predictive accuracies[64]). Without an 
explicit a priori analysis plan, it is not possible to assess the degree to which any particular 
result may reflect data-driven analysis choices (either intentional or unintentional). One 
solution to this problem is to encourage replication of any particular result, as is common in 
genetic association studies [65] and is an emerging practice in psychology. However, for 
very precious samples such as the one collected by Aharoni et al. [51], this may not be 
practical. A useful alternative in such a situation would be pre-study registration for any 
research study that is meant to influence public policy, similar to the approach currently used 
for clinical trials. While not a cure-all, a greater emphasis on external validity and reporting 
of out-of-sample prediction measures would help to improve robustness of published study 
results.
Best practices for neuroprediction
It is certain that future research will continue to assess the ability of neuroscience methods to 
predict violent behavior, and we hope that such research will ultimately prove to be 
effective, given the pressing need for more effective prediction of future violence. Here we 
outline a set of principles that will help maximize the effectiveness and robustness of future 
studies. We would also note that most of these principles are not unique to neuroprediction, 
but, in principle, should apply to any new predictive method.
Pre-registration
The credibility of clinical trials in medicine has been greatly enhanced by the requirement 
for registration of study designs, hypotheses, and outcome measures prior to undertaking a 
study. In particular, the natural experiment occasioned by increased requirements for clinical 
trial registration in 2000 has shown that positive outcomes are more likely and estimated 
treatment effects are significantly larger for unregistered than for registered studies [66,67]. 
This is particularly important for fMRI given the immense degree of analytic flexibility in 
fMRI analysis [68]. There is a growing consensus (shared by most of the present authors) 
that pre-study registration of designs, hypotheses, analysis plans, and outcome measures 
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could greatly increase both the reliability and acceptance of results from neuroimaging 
studies.
Validation
It is essential that all predictive outcomes be validated using an independent sample. The 
incorporation of repeated cross-validation and/or bootstrap validation in the process of 
model selection, and in reporting of model performance using a discovery cohort, can 
certainly reduce overoptimism bias and naïve applications based on early results (see Box 
1). But while these methods can be useful for assessing the best model for a particular 
dataset, they also can be biased by preprocessing and multiple, iterative model 
reassessments. The gold standard should be a completely separate validation dataset that is 
kept aside until final testing of the hypotheses, using the models developed from the training 
dataset. Another alternative is for different research groups to separately test a specific 
hypothesis in independent studies, which are then reported in a single manuscript. This 
proposal is inspired by the now-standard requirement for replication in genetic association 
studies[69], which has motivated consortia to collaborate on papers that include replication 
across multiple samples. Yet another provocative alternative is the use of “blind analysis”
[70], in which the researcher analyzing the data is blinded to some aspect of the data (e.g. 
through shuffling of variable labels).
It is also essential that neuropredictive methods are compared against the state of the art in 
behavioral prediction methods. It is common in neuroimaging studies to find that the 
predictive accuracy of imaging data is well above chance, but that the marginal improvement 
of prediction for neuroimaging compared to behavioral prediction is miniscule. Given the 
substantial added expense of neuroimaging compared to actuarial prediction, it is important 
to establish that neuropredictive methods improve prediction sufficiently to overcome the 
relative cost. This is, of course, the same issue as commonly occurs in medical science, 
where disease biomarkers considered promising when studied in isolation are then found to 
be redundant with less expensive predictors in routine workups. One counterpoint to this 
maxim is when neuroimaging provides greater mechanistic insights into the nature of 
prediction; for example, it could be the case that neuroimaging and behavioral measures are 
equally predictive of behavior, but the neuroimaging data provide additional guidance 
regarding the most effective therapeutic means for preventing further violence in each 
individual.
Appropriate norms
The development of norms for actuarial methods of violence prediction has required very 
large sample sizes in order to ensure that the predictions are accurate across a wide range of 
demographics. For example, recent studies that have validated the Oxford Risk of 
Recidivism tool (OxRec) [71] and the Oxford Mental Illness and Violence tool (OxMIV)
[72] had samples sizes of 47,326 and 75,158 respectively. For neuroimaging prediction to be 
equally reliable, we will need norming datasets large enough to provide accurate predictions 
for individuals who vary in many different ways. Without such norms, the criteria for 
prediction will vary due to differences in the sociodemographic and clinical compositions of 
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the samples from which they are derived, potentially increasing controversy in the 
interpretation and acceptance of individual risk assessments.
Concluding Remarks
The development of accurate methods to predict future violent behavior using behavioral, 
genetic, and/or neuroscientific data could have a significant impact on the legal system, 
especially on sentencing as well as prevention and treatment. Deeper and more mechanistic 
understanding of violent behavior—with objective techniques—has the potential to reduce 
suffering of victims, decrease the enormous economic burdens of crime, and minimize 
foregone futures of young people whose life trajectories could have been altered but for their 
involvement in impulsive crimes. Neuroprediction offers the potential to identify causal 
mechanisms that distinguish the callous psychopath from the neurologically immature or 
dysfunctional individual who might benefit from treatment or preventive measures. Despite 
the potential, however, current techniques fall far short of this ideal of objective mechanistic 
prediction. As we have discussed, the limited studies that have been published do not seem 
to approach what would be required to make definitive judgments in a legal context, or even 
to meet the legal standards for admissibility of expert testimony (see Outstanding 
Questions). As research accumulates, the uncertainty regarding accuracy of individual 
predictions may diminish, but the societal impact of research on neuroprediction will depend 
on future commitments to the application of rigorous methodology. Whether neuroprediction 
will ever reach its hypothetical potential, transcending the role of circumstances in human 
behavior to warrant serious impact in legal settings, remains an open question.
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• Violent behavior is a costly large-scale societal problem
• There is growing interest in using neuroscience data to assess risk for future 
violent behavior, but the utility of neuroscience for violence risk assessment 
remains to be established
• We review what is currently known about the underlying neurobiological 
mechanisms of violence, and evaluate recent neuroprediction efforts.
• Finally, we outline a set of practices for enhancing the validity and reliability 
of future risk assessment based on neuroscientific measures.
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